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To the Editors: 
Aaron Friedberg's comprehensive and insightful discussion of the theoretical bases 
for alternative expectations of future U.S.-China relations ends by explaining how vari- 
ous elements highlighted by liberal, realist, and constructivist perspectives might be 
combined.' I would like to offer an extension that builds on Friedberg's penultimate 
paragraph. 
With the exception of this paragraph, Friedberg's synthesis addresses how liberal, re- 
alist, and constructivist elements could be combined in various ways that are essen- 
tially additive (pp. 39-45); that is, the forces he describes can be added to or subtracted 
from each other in different ways, depending on the observer's theoretical perspective 
and empirical expectations. But a systems perspective would lead scholars to consider 
somewhat more complex possibilities.2 This way of seeing the world sensitizes us to 
feedbacks, interactions, and contingencies. Indeed, not only does the magnitude of the 
impact of one variable often depend on the state of other variables, but even the sign of 
its impact can be affected as well. 
To start with, feedbacks over time are possible. The theoretical perspectives 
Friedberg discusses touch on these, but a systems view highlights them. Most obvi- 
ously, as liberals argue, the effects of democracy, domestic economic growth, and inter- 
national trade can produce a benign and self-reinforcing cycle. It is no accident that 
wealth and democracy tend to be correlated: increased wealth makes power sharing 
less risky for rulers and usually leads to the diffusion of power, while the rule of law 
and citizen participation encourage economic growth. In the modern era, these pro- 
cesses are enhanced by economic intercourse between as well as within countries. Fur- 
thermore, they are reciprocally implicated in peace and good relations with other 
countries. So it is not merely that each of these factors makes an independent impact; 
rather, each reinforces the others. Pessimists can find feedback loops between China's 
rising power as stressed by realists and the negative images stressed by constructivists. 
As China gains greater ability to threaten the United States and its allies, these coun- 
tries are likely to draw disturbing inferences about its intentions and character, thereby 
leading the Chinese leadership to expect further deterioration of relations and reasons 
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for an enhanced military buildup. Optimists, understanding that feedbacks are not 
automatic but can be affected by actors' expectations about them, may argue that this 
very danger explains why the outcome is unlikely. U.S. and Chinese leaders can 
see what will happen if they do not take special efforts to defuse tensions and build 
better relations, and so the knowledge of the likely feedbacks can be used to derail 
them.3 
As this indicates, a focus on feedbacks reminds us that the actual and desired state of 
political relations can be independent, as well as dependent, variables. Thus current 
and expected good relations between countries can lead to increased trade and invest- 
ment, and the extent of current U.S.-Chinese economic relations (with its attendant 
positive impact on Chinese economic development and decreased prices for U.S. con- 
sumers) would have been inconceivable had political relations between the two coun- 
tries remained bad. 
Feedbacks help explain how systems change over time; interaction effects remind us 
that the impact of any two variables at any one point in time may not be additive. In- 
deed, the sign as well as the magnitude of the impact of one variable can depend on the 
state of another. To take the most obvious example, the growth of China's economy 
could have a strongly positive effect on Sino-American relations if China is seen as fol- 
lowing a benign policy toward Taiwan, but it would have a negative effect if it were 
seen as menacing the United States' ally. Less dramatical, but still significant, the be- 
nign effect of any given increment of increased Sino-American economic activity is 
likely to be magnified by increases in democratization within China. The latter factor 
does not merely add to the former; it multiplies it. 
Finally, as Friedberg notes toward the end of his article, contingencies and path de- 
pendence are possible. Any number of accidents could push Sino-American relations in 
a particular direction; and if this generates positive feedback, the change (for better or 
for worse) could be hard to reverse. Natural disasters have brought countries together 
and perhaps helped end civil wars, as in the case of Indonesia. If Taylor Fravel is cor- 
rect, instability within China could lead it to seek better relations with Taiwan and the 
United States, which in turn could set these countries on a more benign path.4 Malign 
disturbances are perhaps easier to imagine. Domestic politics in Taiwan could heighten 
Chinese fear of independence, leading to a military demonstration that could rein- 
vigorate the negative image of China in American eyes, or the temporary rise of a 
strongly anti-Chinese faction in the U.S. government could lead to a deterioration in 
Sino-American relations, which could further strengthen the hand of hawks in each 
country. Or a downturn in the U.S. economy could lead to the growth of anti-Chinese 
sentiment, which could set political relations in a different direction and, if it produced 
restrictions on Chinese imports, lead Chinese leaders to view the United States as an 
unreliable partner or even to infer that the economic conditions were merely an excuse 
for malign U.S. leaders to harm China. 
3. Ibid., chap. 7. 
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Obviously, these examples are stark, if not overdrawn. They are intended neither to 
be definitive nor to contradict Friedberg's analysis, but to show that thinking more sys- 
tematically about the sort of nonlinear dynamics that make politics so fascinating and 
hard to manage can be fruitful. 
-Robert Jervis 
New York City 
ERRATUM 
On page 149 of Vera Achvarina and Simon F. Reich's summer 2006 article, "No 
Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons, and the Recruitment of Child Sol- 
diers," the second equation should read as follows: 
CS=a + fp,Poverty + P2 Orphans + P3 Access +E, 
We regret the error. 
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